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A

ttaching incentives to students’
performance on standardized exams has
the potential to alleviate the principalagent problem inherent in the relationship
between stakeholders and schools,
improve student achievement, and
reduce the costs of public education.
Indeed, this is the motivation behind the
state-level consequential accountability
policies introduced in the 1990s and the
2001 passage of the federal No Child
Left Behind Act (NCLB).1 The efficacy
of such policies is central to the current
debate surrounding the reauthorization of
the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, under which NCLB was first passed.
Consequential accountability policies
are typically associated with modest,
statistically significant increases in
student achievement ranging from 10
to 30 percent of a test-score standard
deviation (Figlio and Loeb 2011).
However, critics contend that these
test-score gains are illusory and reflect
strategic responses by schools rather
than true learning gains. Evidence of
strategic responses to the incentives
provided by consequential accountability
policies runs the gamut from the
relatively innocuous (e.g., “narrowing of
the curriculum”) to the nefarious (e.g.,
explicit teacher cheating). As a result, the
mechanisms through which consequential
accountability policies affect academic
achievement are not entirely understood,
but they have implications for the design
of future education policies and the
public sector performance standards
movement more generally.
Increased teacher effort is one
potential mechanism through which
consequential accountability policies
might improve student achievement,
as teachers play a critical role in the
educational process. Teacher attendance
measures one dimension of teacher
effort that is known to affect student
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achievement.2 Moreover, teacher
absences are financially costly and create
negative externalities by influencing
the attendance of their peers. This
article is based on a recent Upjohn
Institute Working Paper (Gershenson
[2015]; see http://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/217/) that examines
one potential mechanism through
which consequential accountability
policies affect student achievement by
considering how, if at all, the threat of
sanctions associated with failing to meet
NCLB’s performance standards affected
teacher absence rates in North Carolina.
Accountability Pressure in Early Years
of NCLB
NCLB required all schools to make
adequate yearly progress (AYP), which
included meeting percent proficient,
attendance, and test-participation
thresholds both overall and for specific
subgroups of the student population.
Furthermore, the act mandated additional
sanctions (e.g., restructuring and state
takeover) on Title 1 schools that failed
to make AYP in consecutive years. The
subsequent discussion focuses on Title 1
schools, as they comprise the majority of
North Carolina’s public primary schools,
and the threat of sanctions there was
particularly salient.
In 2004, teachers in schools that
failed to make AYP in 2003 (the first
year of NCLB) were under considerably

more pressure than their counterparts in
schools that made AYP in 2003, as the
former were in schools at risk of failing
to make AYP for two consecutive school
years.3 Thus, teachers in schools that
failed to make AYP in 2003 compose the
treatment group, while their counterparts
in schools that made AYP in 2003
compose the control group. However,
a simple comparison between the 2004
attendance records of teachers in the
treatment and control groups is unlikely
to provide a valid estimate of the effect
of failing to make AYP on teacher
absences, as the treatment (i.e., failing
to make AYP in 2003) was not randomly
assigned to schools. Specifically, the
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003
might systematically differ from their
counterparts that made AYP in 2003 in
both observable and unobservable ways.
Main Results
That problem can be avoided using a
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy
that uses data from 2003 to control for
preexisting differences between treatment
and control schools. The method’s name
comes from the fact that in its simplest
form, the DD estimate is simply the
difference between two differences: the
difference in average annual absences
between treatment and control schools,
between 2003 and 2004. Table 1 presents
the sample averages used to compute the
DD estimate of the effect of failing to
make AYP on annual teacher absences.
The DD point estimate of −1.25, which
is strongly statistically significant,
suggests that on average teachers in
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003
took 1.25 fewer absences in 2004. To
put this number in perspective, note that
the average teacher was absent about
8.7 times per year, so 1.25 represents a

Table 1 Mean Annual Teacher Absences
Year
School failed in 2003 School passed in 2003
2004
7.97
8.97
2003
9.01
8.76
Difference
−1.04
0.21

Difference
−1.00
0.25
−1.25***

NOTE: N = 8,080 teacher-years. The standard error of the difference-in-differences estimate of
−1.25, which is robust to clustering at the school level, is 0.43. ***p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data
Center.

Employment Research

Sensitivity Analysis
The DD estimates discussed above
are suggestive of a causal effect of
failing AYP in 2003, and the resulting
increase in accountability pressure, on
teachers’ 2004 attendance. However, the
validity of DD estimates hinges on the
“common trends” assumption that there
was no preexisting differential trend
in teacher absences in treated schools
(i.e., schools that failed AYP in 2003).
This assumption is easily tested in an
event-study framework using several
years of data prior to the passage of
NCLB. Intuitively, the event-study model
includes placebo “treatment effects”
of failing AYP in 2003 on absences in
prior years. Event-study estimates, using
data from 1997 to 2004, are depicted in
Figure 1. The bars represent the effect of
failing AYP in 2003 on annual teacher

Figure 1 Event-Study Estimates, 1997–2004
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14 percent decrease. The DD estimate
remains similar in magnitude when the
sample is restricted to teachers who did
not change schools between 2003 and
2004, which suggests that the effect of
sanctions associated with failing AYP
on teacher absences is driven by withinteacher changes in behavior, not by
changes in the composition of schools’
teaching staffs. The decrease is even
larger among more effective teachers
who attended selective undergraduate
institutions and who have higher valueadded measures of effectiveness.
More sophisticated regression-based
DD estimators that control for observed
teacher qualifications, observed school
characteristics, school fixed effects,
teacher fixed effects, and school-specific
time trends yield similarly sized,
statistically significant estimates ranging
from about −1.0 to −1.6. These results
suggest that the main results are not
driven by changes in the student bodies
of “treatment” schools relative to those
of “control” schools between 2003 and
2004. The DD estimate presented in
Table 1 is similarly robust to the way in
which teacher absences are measured.
For example, the analogous DD estimate
of the effect of accountability pressure on
the likelihood that a teacher is absent 15
or more times per school year is −0.03,
which represents a 30 percent decline.
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NOTE: 95% confidence intervals, which are robust to clustering at the school level, are reported.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data
Center.

absences in each year from 1998 onward.
If the common trends assumption
holds—that is, there is no preexisting
differential trend in the treated schools—
the 1998–2003 interaction terms should
be statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Indeed, this is exactly what we see
in Figure 1, as each of the 95 percent
confidence intervals includes zero.
However, in 2004, the year in which we
expect to see an effect of failing AYP in
2003, the estimated effect is about −1.10
and statistically significantly different
from zero. This is in line with the DD
estimates discussed above and provides
further evidence that the DD estimate
presented in Table 1 can be given a causal
interpretation.
Conclusion
The estimated effect of performance
standards on teacher absences is
consistent with previous research on
the malleability of teacher effort, as
Ahn (2013) and Jacob (2013) find
evidence that teacher effort, as measured
by teacher absences, responds to
incentives. Moreover, the magnitudes of
the effects discussed above are similar
to those of the estimated effects of a
policy change in Chicago that granted
principals the discretion to dismiss

probationary teachers (Jacob 2013).
Finally, the estimates reported here likely
underestimate the total effect of NCLB’s
accountability pressure on teacher effort,
as NCLB placed pressure on all schools,
including those that made AYP in 2003,
and attendance only represents one
dimension of effort.
The results discussed here have at
least three implications for education
policy and for public-sector performance
standards more generally. First, that
teacher absences declined in response
to increased accountability pressure
suggests that one mechanism through
which consequential accountability
policies affect student achievement is
through increased teacher effort. Second,
these results contribute to the growing
body of evidence that teacher effort, as
measured by absences, responds to both
school- and individual-level incentives.
In particular, salient incentives associated
with school-level academic performance
can alter individual teacher behaviors.
Finally, the heterogeneity in teachers’
responses to the threat of sanctions
suggests potential benefits to policy
designs and teacher training programs
that account for such differences. For
example, to the extent that teachers in
tested and nontested grades responded
differently to the threat of sanctions,
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standard labor economic theory suggests
that if jobs in tested grades are more
stressful, such jobs can pay compensating
differentials. The differentials need not be
monetary and could instead be provided
in the form of additional planning
periods, teaching aids, mentorship, or
professional development. Similarly, that
the increase in effort was particularly
strong among more effective teachers
suggests that providing additional support
to less effective teachers may be helpful,
particularly for teachers and schools
subject to increased accountability
pressure.
Notes
1. See Figlio and Loeb (2011) for a
thorough review of such policies.
2. For example, Herrmann and Rockoff
(2012) provide persuasive evidence that
teacher absences in New York City’s public
schools harmed student achievement.
3. Years refer to the spring semester of
academic years, so 2003 refers to the 2002–
2003 academic year.
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